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Abstract
In this work we show that the hardness of the Learning with Errors problem
with errors taken from the discrete Gaussian distribution implies the hardness of
the Learning with Errors problem with errors taken from the symmetric Skellam
distribution. Due to the sample preserving search-to-decision reduction by Mic-
ciancio and Mol the same result applies to the decisional version of the problem.
Thus, we provide a variant of the Learning with Errors problem that is hard based
on conjecturally hard lattice problems and uses a discrete error distribution that is
similar to the continuous Gaussian distribution in that it is closed under convolu-
tion. As an application of this result we construct a post-quantum cryptographic
protocol for differentially private data anlysis in the distributed model. The secu-
rity of this protocol is based on the hardness of the new variant of the Decisional
Learning with Errors problem. A feature of this protocol is the use of the same
noise for security and for differential privacy resulting in an efficiency boost.
1 Introduction
In recent years the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem received a lot of attention in
the cryptographic research community. As instance of the LWE problem we are given
a uniformly distributed matrix A P Zλˆκq and a noisy codeword y “ Ax ` e P Zλq
with an error term e P Zλq chosen from a proper error distribution χλ and an unknown
x P Zκq . The task is to find the correct vector x. In the decisional version of this problem
(DLWE problem) we are given pA,yq and have to decide whether y “ Ax` e or y is a
uniformly distributed vector in Zλq . In [18] a search-to-decision reduction was provided
to show that the two problems are essentially equivalent in the worst case and in [15] a
sample preserving search-to-decision reduction was provided for certain cases showing the
equivalence in the average case. Moreover, in [18] the average-case-hardness of the search
problem was established by the construction of an efficient quantum algorithm for worst-
case-lattice-problems using an efficient solver of the LWE problem if the error distribution
˚The research was supported by the DFG Research Training Group GRK 1817{1
χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution. Accordingly, most cryptographic applications of
the LWE problem used a discrete Gaussian error distribution for their constructions.
In this work we are concerned with the question whether the hardness of the LWE
problem can be established for other discrete distributions, especially for reproducible
distributions, i.e. distributions that are closed under convolution (- the discrete Gaussian
distribution is not reproducible). This question is motivated by the following application.
In [19] the notion of Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) was introduced. A PSA scheme
is a cryptographic protocol between n users and an untrusted aggregator. It enables each
user to securely send encrypted time-series data to the aggregator. The aggregator is
then able to decrypt the aggregate of all data in each time step, but cannot retrieve any
further information about the individual data. In [22] it was shown that a PSA scheme
can be built upon any key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function and some security
guarantees were provided. In this paper we instantiate a concrete PSA scheme with a
key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function constructed from the DLWE problem.
A PSA scheme enables the users to output statistics over their data under differential
privacy. This notion was introduced in [7] and is a measure for statistical disclosure
of private data. Usually, pǫ, δq-differential privacy is preserved by using a mechanism
that adds properly distributed noise to the statistics computed over a database with
individual private data of users. In most of the works on differentialy privacy, these
mechanisms are considered in the centralised setting, where a trusted authority collects
the individual data in the clear and performs the perturbation process. In contrast,
a PSA scheme allows the users to perform differentially private data analysis in the
distributed setting, i.e. without the need of relying on a trusted authority. In light of
that, the Skellam mechanism was introduced in [22] and shown to preserve differential
privacy. The advantage of the Skellam mechanism over other mechanisms (like the
Laplace [7], the Exponential [13], the Geometric [8], the Gaussian [6] or the Binomial
[6]) mechanisms is that it is discrete (enabling cryptographic operations), maintains
relatively high accuracy and is reproducible. This property allows all users to generate
noise of small variance, that sums up to the value for the required level of differential
privacy. Therefore the Skellam mechanism is well-suited for an execution through a PSA
scheme.
We will take advantage of these properties of the Skellam distribution for our DLWE-
based PSA scheme by using errors following the symmetric Skellam distribution Skµ
with variance µ rather than the discrete Gaussian distribution. Therefore we need to
show the average-case-hardness of the LWE problem with errors taken from the Skellam
distribution. Now we can state the main theorem that will be shown in this work.
Theorem 1. Let κ be a security parameter and let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq with λ ą
3κ. Let q “ qpκq “ polypκq be a sufficiently large prime modulus and ρ ą 0 such
that ρq ě 2λ?κ. If there exists a PPT-algorithm that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skpρqq2{4q
problem with non-negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantum-algorithm
that approximates the decision-version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the
shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pλκ{ρq in the worst case.
Based on the same assumptions, the decisional version DLWEpκ, λ, q, Skpρqq2{4q of the
problem is also hard due to the search-to-decision reduction in [15]. Hence, the error
terms in our DLWE-based PSA scheme are used for two tasks: establishing the cryp-
tographic security of the scheme and the distributed generation of noise for preserving
differential privacy.
Our proof of Theorem 1 is inspired by techniques used in [5] where a variant of the
LWE problem with uniform errors on a small support is shown to be hard. As in [5],
we will construct a lossy code for the error distribution Skµ from the LWE problem with
discrete Gaussian errors. Variants of lossy codes were first used in [17] and since then
had applications in different hardness reductions, such as the reduction from the LWE
problem to the Learning with Rounding problem in [2]. Lossy codes are pseudo-random
codes seeming to be good codes. However, encoding messages with a lossy code and
adding certain errors annihilates any information on the message. On the other hand,
encoding the same message using a truly random code and adding the same type of error
preserves the message. We will conclude that recovering the message when encoding
with a random code and adding noise must be computationally hard. If this was not the
case, lossy codes could be efficiently distinguished from random codes, contradicting the
pseudo-randomness-property of lossy codes. As in [5] and opposed to the LWE prob-
lem with discrete Gaussian errors, our worst-to-average case reduction depends on the
number λ of LWE-samples. Thus, we will consider a λ-bounded LWE problem, where
λ has a fixed polypκq upper bound. This does not restrict our application to PSA and
differential privacy, since we will identify λ with the total number of queries processed
during the execution of PSA.
Essential definitions and known facts about used distributions, the Learning with Errors
problem and lossy codes are given in Sections 2 and 3 respectively. The proof of Theorem
1 is provided in Section 4 and in Section 5 we show how this result can be applied to the
construction of a PSA scheme, thus yielding a prospective post-quantum cryptographic
protocol for data analyses under differential privacy.
Remark 1. The result from r5s does not provide a proper error distribution for our
DLWE-based PSA scheme since a differentially private mechanism with uniform noise
provides no accuracy to statistical data analyses.
Remark 2. The original result from r18s states that the LWE problem is hard in the set
T “ R{Z when the noise is distributed according to the continuous Gaussian distribution
(with a certain bound on the variance) modulo 1. Although the continuous Gaussian
distribution is reproducible as well, it does not seem to be a good idea to instantiate it
instead of the Skellam distribution in the DLWE-based PSA scheme: For data processing
reasons the values would have to be discretised. The resulting noise would follow a discrete
Gaussian distribution which is not reproducible any more. The larger the number of
users the more independent samples of discrete Gaussian noise would have to be added
together. Moreover, if the total noise has to be invariant to the number of users (e.g.
in order to keep the accuracy of the statistics), then the discretisation causes a stronger
deviation from the discrete Guassian distribution the larger the number of users becomes.
Therefore the deviation from a truely pǫ, δq-differentially private analysis would scale with
the number of users.
2 Preliminaries
Let q ą 2 be a prime. We handle elements from Zq as their central residue-class
representation. This means that x1 P Zq is identified with x ” x1 mod q for x P
t´pq ´ 1q{2, . . . , pq ´ 1q{2u thereby lifting x1 from Zq to Z.
2.1 Distributions
Let X be a set. We denote by UpXq the uniform distribution on X . Let χ be a
distribution (on X). We denote by x Ð χ (or sometimes x Ð χpXq) the sampling of
x (from X) according to χ. If A Ð χaˆb (or A Ð χpXaˆbq) then A is an a ˆ b-matrix
constructed by picking every entry independently (from X) according to the distribution
χ.
Definition 1 (Discrete Gaussian Distribution[18]). Let q be an integer and let Φs denote
the normal distribution with variance s2{p2πq. Let Ψα denote the discretised Gaussian
distribution with variance pαqq2{p2πq, i.e. Ψα is sampled by taking a sample from Φαq
and performing a randomised rounding r4s. Let Dν be the discretised Gaussian distribu-
tion with variance ν, i.e. Dν “ Ψ?2πν{q.
Definition 2 (Skellam Distribution [20]). Let µ1, µ2 ą 0. A discrete random variable
X is drawn according to the Skellam distribution with parameters µ1, µ2 (short: X Ð
Skµ1,µ2) if it has the following probability distribution function ψµ1,µ2 : Z ÞÑ R:
ψµ1,µ2pkq “ expp´pµ1 ` µ2qq
ˆ
µ1
µ2
˙k{2
Ikp2?µ1µ2q,
where Ik is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (see pages 374–378 in r1s).
A random variable X Ð Skµ1,µ2 has variance µ1 ` µ2 and can be generated as
the difference of two random variables drawn according to the Poisson distribution of
mean µ1 and µ2, respectively [20]. Note that the Skellam distribution is not generally
symmetric. However, we only consider the particular case µ1 “ µ2 “ µ{2 and refer to
this symmetric distribution as Skµ “ Skµ{2,µ{2.
2.2 Learning with Errors
We will consider a λ-bounded LWE problem, where the adversary is given λpκq “ polypκq
samples (which we can write conveniently in matrix-form). As observed in [5], this con-
sideration poses no restrictions to most cryptographic applications of the LWE problem,
since they require only an a-priori fixed number of samples. In our application to differ-
ential privacy (Section 5) we will identify λ with the number of queries in a pre-defined
time-series.
Problem 1. λ-bounded LWE Search-Problem, Average-Case Version. Let κ be
a security parameter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and q “ qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be
a distribution on Zq. Let x Ð UpZκq q, let A Ð UpZλˆκq q and let e Ð χλ. The goal of
the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA,Ax` eq, to find x.
Problem 2. λ-bounded LWE Distinguishing-Problem. Let κ be a security param-
eter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and q “ qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a distribution on
Zq. Let xÐ UpZκq q, let AÐ UpZλˆκq q and let eÐ χλ. The goal of the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq
problem is, given pA,yq, to decide whether y “ Ax` e or y “ u with uÐ UpZλq q.
2.3 Entropy and Lossy Codes
We introduce the map-conditional entropy as starting point for our technical tools. It
can be seen as a measure for ambiguity.
Definition 3 (Map-conditional entropy). Let χ be a probability distribution with finite
support and let X Ð χ. Let Supppχq be the support of χ, ξ P Supppχq and let f, g be two
(possibly randomised) maps on the domain Supppχq. The pf, g, ξq-conditional entropy
Hf,g,ξpXq of X is defined as
Hf,g,ξpXq “ ´ log2pPrrX “ ξ | fpXq “ gpξqsq.
In the remainder of the paper we will see f “ fA,e and g “ gA,e as maps to the set
of LWE instances, i.e.
fA,epyq “ gA,epyq “ Ay` e.
In this work we consider the pfA,e, fA,e˜, x˜q-conditional entropy
HfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq “ ´ log2pPrrx “ x˜ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜sq,
of a random variable x, i.e. the entropy of x given that a LWE instance generated with
pA,x, eq is equal to another LWE instance generated with pA, x˜, e˜q. Now we provide the
notion of lossy codes, which is a main technical tool used in the proof of the hardness
result.
Definition 4 (Families of Lossy Codes [5]). Let κ be a security parameter, let λ “
λpκq “ polypκq and let q “ qpκq ě 2 be a modulus, ∆ “ ∆pκq and let χ be a distribution
on Zq. Let tCκ,λ,qu be a family of distributions where Cκ,λ,q is defined on Zλˆκq . The
distribution family tCκ,λ,qu is ∆-lossy for the error distribution χ, if the following hold:
1. Cκ,λ,q is pseudo-random: It holds that Cκ,λ,q «c UpZλˆκq q.
2. Cκ,λ,q is lossy: Let fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let A Ð Cκ,λ,q, x˜ Ð UpZκq q, e˜ Ð χλ, let
xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then it holds that
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq ě ∆s ě 1´ negpκq.
3. UpZλˆκq q is non-lossy: Let fB,bpyq “ By`b. Let AÐ UpZλˆκq q, x˜Ð UpZκq q, e˜Ð
χλ, let xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then it holds that
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq “ 0s ě 1´ negpκq.
Note that our definition of lossy codes deviates from the definition of lossy codes
provided in [5], since we use another type of entropy (which in general may be larger
than the conditional min-entropy considered in [5]). We will see that our notion of
map-conditional entropy suffices for showing the hardness of the LWE problem.
3 Basic Facts
3.1 Facts about the used Distributions
We need to find a value such that a random variable distributed according to the discrete
Gaussian distribution exceeds this value only with negligible probability.
Lemma 2 (Bound on the discrete Gaussian distribution). Let κ be a security parameter,
let s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and let ν “ νpκq “ polypκq. Let ζ “ ζpκq ą 0 be an integer. Let
g1, . . . , gζ Ð Dν . Then
Pr
”
|g1 ` . . .` gζ | ą
a
ζνs
ı
ď negpκq.
Proof. Since g1, . . . , gζ are independent sub-gaussian random variables with sub-gaussian
parameter
?
ν, the result follows from an application of the Hoeffding-type inequality
for sub-gaussian random variables (see Proposition 5.10 in [23]).
We use the fact that the sum of independent Skellam random variables is a Skellam
random variable, i.e. the Skellam distribution is reproducible.
Lemma 3 (Reproducibility of Skµ1,µ2 [20]). Let X Ð Skµ1,µ2 and Y Ð Skµ3,µ4 be inde-
pendent random variables. Then Z :“ X ` Y is distributed according to Skµ1`µ3,µ2`µ4 .
An induction step shows that the sum of n i.i.d. symmetric Skellam random variables
with variance µ is a symmetric Skellam random variable with variance nµ. For our
analysis, we will use the following bound on the ratio of modified Bessel functions of the
first kind.
Lemma 4 (Bound on Ikpµq [10]). For real k, let Ikpµq be the modified Bessel function
of the first kind and order k. Then
1 ą Ikpµq
Ik´1pµq ą
´k `
a
k2 ` µ2
µ
, k ě 0.
Moreover, we need a proper bound on the symmetric Skellam distribution that holds
with probability exponentially close to 1.
Lemma 5 (Bound on the Skellam distribution). Let κ be a security parameter, let
s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and let µ “ µpκq “ polypκq with µ ą s ą 0. Let X Ð Skµ. Then
PrrX ą s?µs ď negpκq.
Proof. Applying the Laplace transform and the Markov’s inequality we obtain for any
t ą 0,
PrrX ą s?µs “ PrretX ą ets?µs ď Ere
tXs
ets
?
µ
.
As shown in [9], the moment generating function of X „ Skpµq is
EretXs “ e´µp1´coshptqq,
where coshptq “ pet ` e´tq{2. Hence, we have
PrrX ą s?µs ď e´µp1´coshptqq´ts
?
µ ă e´sp1´coshptqq´ts3{2 .
Fix t “ arsinhp1{?sq. Then
PrrX ą s?µs ăe´sp1´
?
1`1{sq´s3{2 arsinhp1{?sq
“e´s ¨ es¨p
?
1`1{s´?s arsinhp1{?sqq
ăe´s ¨ e2{3
“negpκq.
To see the last inequality, observe that the function fpsq “ s¨p
a
1` 1{s´?s arsinhp1{?sqq
is monotonically increasing and its limit is 2{3.
3.2 Facts about Learning with Errors
In [18], Regev established worst-to-average-case connections between conjecturally hard
lattice problems and the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dνq problem.
Theorem 6 (Worst-to-Average Case [18]). Let κ be a security parameter and let q “ qpκq
be a modulus, let α “ αpκq P p0, 1q be such that αq ą 2?κ. If there exists a probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithm solving the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dpαqq2{p2πqq problem with non-
negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates
the decision-version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest indepen-
dent vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pκ{αq in the worst case.
We use the search-to-decision reduction from [15] basing the hardness of Problem 2
on the hardness of Problem 1 which works for any error distribution χ and is sample
preserving.
Theorem 7 (Search-to-Decision [15]). Let κ be a security parameter, q “ qpκq “ polypκq
a prime modulus and let χ be any distribution on Zq. Assume there exists a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time distinguisher that solves the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-
negligible success-probability, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible success-probability.
Finally, we provide a matrix version of Problem 2. The hardness of this version can
be shown by using a hybrid argument as pointed out in [5].
Lemma 8 (Matrix version of LWE). Let κ be a security parameter, λ “ λpκq “ polypκq,
κ1 “ κ1pκq “ polypκq. Assume that the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard. Then pA,AX`
Eq is pseudo-random, where AÐ UpZλˆκq q,XÐ UpZκˆκ
1
q q and EÐ χλˆκ
1
.
3.3 Facts about Lossy Codes
We will use the fact that the existence of a lossy code for an error distribution implies the
hardness of the associated decoding problems. This means, solving the LWE problem is
hard, even though with overwhelming probability the secret is information-theoretically
unique. In [5] it was shown that solving the LWE problem for χ is hard if there exists
a lossy code for χ in the sense of [5]. Here we prove this statement for our definition of
lossy codes. The proof is very similar to the one in [5].
Theorem 9 (Lossy code gives hard LWE). Let κ be a security parameter, let λ “
λpκq “ polypκq and let q “ qpκq be a modulus. Let the distribution χ on Zq be efficiently
samplable. Let ∆ “ ∆pκq “ ωplogpκqq. Then the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard, given
that there exists a family tCκ,λ,qu Ď Zλˆκq of ∆-lossy codes for the error distribution χ.
Proof. Due to the non-lossiness of UpZλˆκq q for χ, instances of LWEpκ, λ, q, χq have a
unique solution with overwhelming probability. Now, let T be a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary solving the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible probability σ.
Using T , we will construct a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher DLWE distin-
guishing UpZλˆκq q and tCκ,λ,qu with non-negligible advantage.
Let DLWE be given A P Zλˆκ as input. It must decide, whether A Ð UpZλˆκq q or
A Ð tCκ,λ,qu. Therefore, DLWE samples x˜ Ð UpZκq and e˜ Ð χλ. It runs T on input
pA,Ax˜ ` e˜q. Then T outputs some x P Zκ. If x “ x˜, then DLWE outputs 1, otherwise
it outputs 0.
If AÐ UpZλˆκq q, then x˜ is unique and then x “ x˜ with probability σ. Therefore
PrrDLWEpAq “ 1 |AÐ UpZλˆκq qs “ σ.
If AÐ tCκ,λ,qu, then T outputs the correct value with probability
Prrx “ x˜ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜s “ 2´HfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq ď 2´∆,
with fB,bpyq “ By ` b. This holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of
pA, x˜, e˜q. This probability is negligible in κ, since ∆ “ ωplogpκqq. Therefore
PrrDLWEpAq “ 1 |AÐ tCκ,λ,qus “ negpκq
and in conclusion DLWE distinguishes UpZλˆκq q and tCκ,λ,qu with probability at least
σ ´ negpκq, which is non-negligible.
We will use the fact that UpZλˆκq q is always non-lossy if the corresponding error
distribution χ can be bounded.
Lemma 10 (Non-lossiness of UpZλˆκq q). Let κ be a security parameter and χ a probability
distribution on Z. Say, the support of χ can be bounded by r “ rpκq “ polypκq. Moreover,
let q ą p4r`1q1`τ for a constant τ ą 0 and λ “ λpκq ą p1`2{τqκ. Let fB,bpyq “ By`b.
Let AÐ UpZλˆκq q, x˜Ð UpZκq q, e˜Ð χλ, let xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq “ 0s ě 1´ negpκq.
The proof of Lemma 10 is identical to the proof of Lemma 3 in [5]: since PrAr||Ax˜||8 ď
2rs ď negpκq (as shown in [5]) and ||e˜´ e||8 ď 2r for independent e, e˜Ð χλ (where the
norm is computed in the central residue-class representation of the elements in Zq), with
probability 1´ negpκq there cannot exist any x P Zκq with x ‰ x˜ and Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜.
4 Proof of the Hardness Result
Now we construct the lossy code for the Skellam distribution. It is essentially the same
construction that was used as lossy code for the uniform error distribution in [5].
Construction 1 (Lossy code for the symmetric Skellam distribution). Let κ be an even
security parameter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq, ν ą 0 and let q “ qpκq be a prime modulus.
The distribution Cκ,λ,q,ν defined on Z
λˆκ
q is specified as follows. Choose A
1 Ð UpZλˆκ{2q q,
TÐ UpZκ{2ˆκ{2q q and GÐ Dλˆκ{2ν . Output
A “ pA1||A1T`Gq.
From Lemma 8 and Theorem 7 it is straightforward that Cκ,λ,q,ν is pseudo-random
in the sense of property 1 of Definition 4 assuming the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dνq
problem.
Lemma 11 (Pseudo-randomness of Construction 1 [5]). For Construction 1 it holds that
Cκ,λ,q,ν «c UpZλˆκq q assuming the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dνq problem.
Let A “ pA1||A1T `Gq be the code as defined in Construction 1. We show that in
our further analysis we can restrict ourselves to considering only G instead of A.
Lemma 12. Let κ be an even integer. Let A “ pA1||A1T ` Gq with A1 P Zλˆκ{2q ,
T P Zκ{2ˆκ{2q and G P Zλˆκ{2q . Then for all x P Zκ{2q there is a x1 P Zκq with Ax1 “ Gx.
Proof. Define rT “ ˆI T
0 I
˙
.
Note that rT P Zκˆκq is a regular matrix. For all x P Zκ{2q set x1 “ rT´1 ¨ p0tr||xtrqtr. Then
Ax1 “pA1||A1T`Gq ¨ x1
“pA1||Gq ¨ rT ¨ rT´1 ¨ p0tr||xtrqtr
“pA1||Gq ¨ p0tr||xtrqtr
“Gx.
To show that Construction 1 is a lossy code for the symmetric Skellam distribution we
prove that the second property of Definition 4 is satisfied. We first prove two supporting
claims and then show the lossiness of Construction 1.
Lemma 13. ´C `?C2 ` 1 ě expp´Cq for all C ě 0.
Proof. Let fpCq “ p´C `?C2 ` 1q exppCq. Then fpCq is monotonically increasing and
fp0q “ 1 ¨ p´0`?0` 1q “ 1.
Lemma 14. Let κ be a security parameter, let s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and let ν “ νpκq “
polypκq. Let λ “ λpκq, ζ “ ζpκq be integers. Let GÐ Dλˆζν . Then for all z P t0, 1uζ the
following hold:
1. Prr||Gz||1 ą λ
?
ζνss ď negpκq.
2. Prr||Gz||22 ą λζνss ď negpκq.
Proof. The claims follow from Lemma 2.
Lemma 15 (Lossiness of Construction 1). Let κ be an even security parameter, s “
spκq “ ωplogpκqq with κ ą s3, let ν “ νpκq, let q “ polypκq be a sufficiently large prime
modulus, let λ “ λpκq ą s and let ∆ “ ∆pκq “ ωplogpκqq. Let µ “ µpκq ě λ2ν. Let
fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let A Ð tCκ,λ,q,νu, let x˜ Ð UpZκq q, e˜ Ð Skλµ, let x Ð UpZκq q and
eÐ Skλµ. Then
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq ě ∆s ě 1´ negpκq.
Proof. Let pMzqj denote the j-th entry of Mz for a matrix M and a vector z. Let
A “ pA1||A1T `Gq be distributed according to tCκ,λ,q,νu with A1 Ð UpZλˆκ{2q q, T Ð
UpZκ{2ˆκ{2q q and GÐ Dλˆκ{2ν . Let e˜ “ pe˜jqj“1,...,λ Ð Skλµ. Then we have the following
chain of (in)equations:
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq ě ∆s
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
“
Prrx “ x˜ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜s ď 2´∆‰
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
Pr
e
rAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ x˜s ¨ Prrx “ x˜s
Prpx,eqrAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜s
ď 2´∆

(1)
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
”
Pr
e
rAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ x˜s¨
¨ Prrx “ x˜sř
zPZκq PrerAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ zs ¨ Prrx “ zs
ď 2´∆
ff
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
«
Pr
e
re “ e˜s ¨ Prrx “ x˜sř
zPZκq PrerApz´ x˜q ` e “ e˜s ¨ Prrx “ zs
ď 2´∆
ff
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
«
Pr
e
re “ e˜s ¨ 1ř
zPZκq PrerApz´ x˜q ` e “ e˜s
ď 2´∆
ff
(2)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
«
Prere “ e˜sř
zPZκq Prere “ Az` e˜s
ď 2´∆
ff
(3)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
Prere “ Az` e˜s
Prere “ e˜s ě 2
∆
fifl
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
śλ
j“1 expp´µq ¨ IpAzqj`e˜j pµqśλ
j“1 expp´µq ¨ Ie˜j pµq
ě 2∆
fifl
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
IpAzqj`e˜j pµq
Ie˜j pµq
ě 2∆
fifl
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
pAzqj`e˜jź
k“1`e˜j
´k `
a
k2 ` µ2
µ
ě 2∆
fifl (4)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
pAzqjź
k“1
¨˝
´pk ` e˜jq
µ
`
dˆ
k ` e˜j
µ
˙2
` 1‚˛ě 2∆
fifl
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»—– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
¨˝
´ppAzqj ` e˜jq
µ
`
dˆ pAzqj ` e˜j
µ
˙2
` 1‚˛pAzqj ě 2∆
fiffifl (5)
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
ˆ
´pAzqj ` e˜j
µ
˙pAzqj
ě 2∆
fifl (6)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
˜
´pAzq
2
j ` pAzqj ¨ e˜j
µ
¸
ě 2∆
fifl
ěPr
A
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
˜
´pAzq
2
j ` pAzqj ¨ s
?
µ
µ
¸
ě 2∆
fifl´ negpκq (7)
“Pr
A
»– ÿ
zPZκq
exp
˜
´
řλ
j“1pAzq2j ` s
?
µ ¨řλj“1pAzqj
µ
¸
ě 2∆
fifl´ negpκq
“Pr
A
»– ÿ
zPZκq
exp
ˆ
´||Az||
2
2 ` s
?
µ ¨ ||Az||1
µ
˙
ě 2∆
fifl´ negpκq
ěPr
G
»– ÿ
zPZκ{2q
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` s
?
µ ¨ ||Gz||1
µ
˙
ě 2∆
fifl´ negpκq. (8)
Equation 1 is an application of the Bayes rule and Equation 2 applies, since x is
sampled according to a uniform distribution. Equation 3 is valid since in the denominator
we are summing over all possible z P Zκq . Inequation 4 is an iterative application of
Theorem 4. Note that the modified Bessel function of the first kind ist symmetric when
considered over integer orders. Therefore, from this point of the chain of (in)equations
(i.e. from Inequation 4), we can assume that e˜j ě 0. Moreover, we can assume that
pAzqj ě 0, since otherwise IpAzqj`e˜j pµq ą I´pAzqj`e˜j pµq. I.e. if pAzqj ă 0, then we
implicitly change the sign of the jth row in the original matrix A while considering
the particular z. In this way we are always considering the worst-case scenario for
every z. Note that this step does not change the distribution of A, since tCκ,λ,q,νu is
symmetric. Inequation 5 holds, since fµpkq “ p´k `
a
k2 ` µ2q{µ is a monotonically
decreasing function. Inequation 6 follows from Lemma 13 by setting C “ ppAzqj` e˜jq{µ.
Inequation 7 holds because of the bound in Lemma 5. Inequation 8 follows from Lemma
12, since A “ pA1||A1T`Gq.
Now consider the set Z Ă t0, 1uκ{2 with each element in Z having hamming weight
exactly κ{4. Then |Z| “ `κ{2
κ{4
˘ ą 2κ{4. Since µ “ λ2ν, from Lemma 14 it follows that
Pr
G
«ÿ
zPZ
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` s
?
µ ¨ ||Gz||1
µ
˙
ě 2κ{4 ¨ exp
ˆ
´κs
4λ
´ s
?
κs
2
˙ff
ě 1´ negpκq,
where the norm is computed in the central residue-class representation of the elements
in Zq. Moreover we have
2κ{4 ¨ exp
ˆ
´κs
4λ
´ s
?
κs
2
˙
ą Cκ
for some constant C ą 1, since κ ą s3 and λ ą s. Therefore
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq ě ∆s
ěPr
G
»– ÿ
zPZκ{2q
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` s
?
µ ¨ ||Gz||1
µ
˙
ě 2∆
fifl´ negpκq
ěPr
G
«ÿ
zPZ
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` s
?
µ ¨ ||Gz||1
µ
˙
ě 2∆
ff
´ negpκq
ě1´ negpκq.
We put the previous results together in order to show the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Theorem 6 the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dνq problem is hard for ν “
pαqq2{p2πq ą 2κ{π if there exists no efficient quantum algorithm approximating the
decision-version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest independent
vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pκ{αq in the worst case. Let q “ qpκq “ polypκq,
s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and λ ą 3κ. Then for ∆ “ ωplogpκqq, Lemma 10 (setting r “ s?µ),
Lemma 11 and Lemma 15 provide that Construction 1 gives us a family of ∆-lossy codes
for the symmetric Skellam distribution with variance µ ě λ2ν. By Theorem 9 this
is sufficient for the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skµq problem. Setting ρ “ αλ yields
pρqq2 ą 4λ2κ and the claim follows. l
By Theorem 7 we get the hardness of the DLWE problem as a corollary.
Corollary 1. Let κ be a security parameter and let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq with λ ą 3κ.
Let q “ qpκq “ polypκq be a sufficiently large prime modulus and ρ ą 0 such that
ρq ě 2λ?κ. If there exists a PPT-algorithm that solves the DLWEpκ, λ, q, Skpρqq2{4q
problem with non-negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantum-algorithm
that approximates the decision-version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the
shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pλκ{ρq in the worst case.
5 Application to Differential Privacy
We turn to showing how the previous result contributes to building prospective post-
quantum secure protocols for differential privacy with a relatively high accuracy. In con-
trast to the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dνq problem, note that for the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skµq
problem we need the standard deviation
?
µ of the symmetric Skellam distribution to
grow linearly in the number λ of equations.
5.1 Security
As mentioned in the introduction, the notion of Private Stream Aggregation (PSA)
was introduced in [19] and in [22] it was shown that a PSA scheme can be built upon
any key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function and some security guarantees were
provided. In the next theorem we recap the result from [22] in a brief form.
Theorem 16 (Weak PRF gives secure protocol [22]). Let κ be a security parameter,
and m,n P N with logpmq “ polypκq, n “ polypκq. Let pG, ¨q, pS, ˚q be finite groups and
G1 Ď G. For some finite set M , let
F “ tFs |Fs :M Ñ G1usPS
be a (possibly randomised) weak PRF family and let
ϕ : t´mn, . . . ,mnu Ñ G
be a mapping. Let the algorithm Setup be defined as follows.
Setup: ppp, T, s0, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1κq, where pp are parameters of G,G1, S,M,F , ϕ.
The keys are si Ð UpSq for all i P rns with s0 “ p˚ni“1 siq´1 and T ĂM such that
all t P T are chosen uniformly at random from M .
Then for any ppt algorithm in the non-adaptive compromise model the following algo-
rithm generates ciphers indistinguishable under a chosen plaintext attack:
PSAEnc: c
ptq
i Ð Fsiptq¨ϕpxptqi q for xptqi P t´m, . . . ,mu, t P T .
Moreover, if F contains only deterministic functions that are homomorphic over S and
if ϕ is an mn-isomorphic embedding, then the following algorithm correctly decryptsřn
i“1 x
ptq
i for all t:
PSADec: compute ϕ
´řn
i“1 x
ptq
i
¯
“ Fs0ptq¨cptq1 ¨. . .¨cptqn and invert.
We can build an instantiation of Theorem 16 (without correct decryption) based on
the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem as follows. Set S “ M “ Zκq , G “ Zq, choose si Ð UpSq
for all i “ 1, . . . , n and s0 “ ´
řn
i“1 si, set Fsiptq “ xt, siy ` eptqi (which is a so-called
randomised weak pseudo-random function as described in [3] and [4]), where e
ptq
i Ð χ
and let ϕ be the identity function. Here the decryption function is defined by
PSADecs0pcptq1 , . . . , cptqn q “ xt, s0y `
nÿ
i“1
c
ptq
i “
nÿ
i“1
x
ptq
i `
nÿ
i“1
e
ptq
i .
Thus, the decryption is not perfectly correct any more, but randomised and it gives us
a noisy sum.
Example 1. Let χ “ Dν{n with variance ν{n “ 2κ{π, then the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem
is hard due to Theorem 6 and Theorem 7. Thus, the above scheme is secure in the sense
of Theorem 16.
Example 2. Let χ “ Skµ{n with variance µ{n “ λ2κ (where λ “ λpκq “ polypκq with
λ ą 3κ), then the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard due to Corollary 1 and the above
scheme is secure in the sense of Theorem 16.
5.2 Privacy
Moreover, the total noise
řn
i“1 e
ptq
i in Example 2 is distributed according to Skµ due to
Lemma 3. Thus, in contrast to the total noise in Example 1, the total noise in Example
2 preserves the distribution of the single noise and can be used for preserving differential
privacy of the correct sum by splitting the task of perturbation among the users.
We provide the definition of pǫ, δq-differential privacy (DP) and a bound on the variance
µ of the symmetric Skellam distribution that is needed in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP.
We recall that a randomised mechanism preserves differential privacy if its application
on two adjacent databases, i.e. databases which differ in one entry only, leads to close
distributions of the output.
Definition 5 (Differential Privacy [7]). Let R be a (possibly infinite) set and let n P N.
A randomised mechanism A : Dn Ñ R preserves pǫ, δq-differential privacy, if for all
adjacent databases D0, D1 P Dn and all R Ď R:
PrrApD0q P Rs ď eǫ ¨ PrrApD1q P Rs ` δ.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
Typically pǫ, δq-DP is achieved by properly perturbing the correct statistics. The next
theorem shows how to use the Skellam distribution for this task.
Theorem 17 (Skellam mechanism preserves DP [22]). Let ǫ ą 0 and let 0 ă δ ă 1. For
all databases D P Dn the randomised mechanism
ASkpDq :“ fpDq ` Y
preserves pǫ, δq-DP with respect to any query f of sensitivity Spfq, where Y Ð Skµ with
µ ě logp1{δq
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
Remark 3. The bound on µ from Theorem 17 is smaller than 2 ¨ pSpfq{ǫq2 ¨ logp1{δq,
thus the standard deviation µ of Y Ð Skµ may be assumed to be linear in Spfq{ǫ (for
constant δ).
Suppose that adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-DP. We
define µuser “ µ{n. Since the Skellam distribution is reproducible, the noise addition
can be executed in a distributed manner: each (non-compromised) user simply adds
(independent) symmetric Skellam noise with variance µuser to her own value in order to
preserve the privacy of the final output.
5.3 Accuracy
Theorem 18 (Accuracy of the Skellam mechanism [22]). Let ǫ ą 0 and 0 ă δ ă 1. Then
for all 0 ă β ă 1 the mechanism specified in Theorem 17 has pα, βq-accuracy, where
α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
.
This means, the error does not exceed α with probability at least 1´ β. Theorem 16
indicates that the set T contains all the time-frames where a query can be executed. For
simplicity we assume that all queries are independent, i.e. the arguments of all queries
are independent. As pointed out in section 2.2 we identify the number of queries with the
number of equations in the instance of the λ-bounded LWE problem, thus |T | “ λ. (A
result in [21] indicates that for an efficient and accurate mechanism this number cannot
be substantially larger than n2, where n is the number of users in the network.) Due to
sequential composition (see for instance Theorem 3 of [14]), in order to preserve pǫ, δq-
DP in all λ queries together, the executed mechanism must preserve pǫ{λ, δq-DP in every
single query. Therefore the following holds: suppose Skµ1-noise is sufficient in order to
preserve pǫ, δq-DP in a single query. Then, due to Remark 3, we must use Skλ2µ1 -noise
in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP in all λ queries.
With Theorem 18 we obtain pα, βq-accuracy for every single query executed during T
with
α “ Spfq
ǫ{λ ¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
“ O
ˆ
Spfqλ
ǫ
˙
,
which is optimal with respect to sequential composition.
5.4 Combining Security, Privacy and Accuracy
Set Spfq “ m and µ “ 2 ¨ pmλ{ǫq2 ¨ logp1{δq. From the discussion from above it follows
that if every user adds Skµ{n-noise to her data in every time-step t P T , then this is
sufficient in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP in all λ sum-queries that are executed during T ,
where for each time-step t P T the data of each user comes from t´m, . . . ,mu.
Furthermore, if for a security parameter κ we have that µ{n “ λ2κ, then we obtain a
secure protocol for analysing sum-queries, where the security is based on prospectively
hard lattice problems. As shown in [22], a combination of these two results provides
computational pǫ, δq-DP in all λ sum-queries. Assume that we want to find values for ǫ, δ
such that when every user adds Skµ{n-noise to her data with µ “ 2 ¨ pmλ{ǫq2 ¨ logp1{δq
to preserve pǫ, δq-DP of the final statistics, then the same noise suffices for providing
security. Therefore the following must be satisfied:
2 ¨ pmλ{ǫq2 ¨ logp1{δq ě nλ2κ.
This inequality holds for
ǫ “ ǫpκq ď
c
2m2 ¨ logp1{δq
κ ¨ n , (9)
indicating that ǫ “ ǫpκq depends on 1{κ. Note that this is consistent with the original
definition of computational DP in [16]. Thus, in addition to a privacy/accuracy trade-off
we also get a security/accuracy trade-off. More specifically, depending on κ and n we
obtain a tight lower bound on the pα, βq-accuracy for every single query executed during
T :
α “ m
ǫ{λ ¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
ěλ ¨
c
κ ¨ n
2 ¨ logp1{δq ¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
“Ωpλ?κ ¨ nq.
Example 3. There are n “ 20, 000 users in a network with variable time-series data
falling in an interval of t´1000, . . . , 1000u, i.e. m “ 1000. Note that the aggregated
sum can not exceed 20, 000, 000. The users want to preserve computational pǫ, δq-DP
with ǫ “ 1 and δ “ 0.1 while evaluating all λ sum-queries over a time period T . They
use the DLWE-based secure protocol for communicating with an untrusted aggregator and
generate symmetric Skellam noise. For a hard DLWE problem, the security parameter
is chosen to be κ “ 200. For these parameters, inequality 9 is satisfied. For the pα, βq-
accuracy per query it holds that
α “ m
ǫ{λ ¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
“ 1000λ ¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` logp10q
˙
.
6 Conclusions
In this work we provided a worst-to-average-case connection from conjecturally hard
lattice problems to the LWE problem with errors following a symmetric Skellam distri-
bution. Our proof relies on the notion of lossy codes from [5]. An implication of this
result is the construction of the first prospective post-quantum Private Stream Aggrega-
tion scheme for data analyses under differential privacy where the errors are used both for
security of the scheme and for the distributed noise generation for preserving differential
privacy. An interesting further direction is to reduce the size of the variance that is nec-
essary for the hardness of the LWE problem with errors following a symmetric Skellam
distribution, especially to abolish the dependence on the number of LWE-samples. An-
other problem to face is to show the hardness of the Ring LWE problem (a more efficient
version of LWE introduced in [12]) with errors following a symmetric Skellam distribu-
tion and to establish a corresponding search-to-decision reduction. Sufficient conditions
on the error distribution for the existence of a search-to-decision reduction for the Ring
LWE problem were provided in [11]. The Skellam distribution does not seem to satisfy
these conditions. Thus, we require a different proof than in [11].
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